Saudi law as lex arbitri: Evaluation of Saudi arbitration law and judicial practice by Baamir, A & Bantekas, I
 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL, Vol. 25, No. 2
© LCIA, 2009
 
239
 
Saudi Law as Lex Arbitri: Evaluation of  
Saudi Arbitration Law and Judicial Practice
 
Saudi Law as Lex Arbitri: Evaluation of  Saudi Arbitration Law and Judicial Practiceby 
 
ABDULRAHMAN BAAMIR* and ILIAS BANTEKAS**
 
Arbitration InternationalWilliam  . P rkArbitration Internation l, Volume 25 Issue 22009
Article
ABSTRACT
 
Disputes settled in Saudi Arabia, or which otherwise contain Saudi elements, are governed by the
Kingdom’s
 
 lex arbitri, 
 
which requires that not only the arbitration clause and
 
 compromis 
 
be
submitted to a designated competent authority for approval, but that the proceedings be supervised
by said competent authority throughout their duration, save where conflict of  laws rules permit the
parties to refer to a foreign jurisdiction. There is no clear line of  authority between contemporary
Saudi arbitration law and Hanbali arbitral jurisprudence. Equally, the decisions of  the arbitral
governing authority (Diwan), although important, does not lend itself  formally to
 
 stare decisis.
 
Our analysis has demonstrated that this Hanbali corpus of  law is in fact more flexible than
Saudi law, particularly on the ground of  interpretative techniques. This finding should dismiss
the notion that Hanbalism is an archaic and backward-looking institution.
 
I
I. INTRODUCTION
 
UNLIKE OTHER Arab nations, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
and Egypt, which have successfully instilled trust in the minds of  foreign and local
investors with regard to the settlement of  business disputes, as well as the
enforcement of  foreign arbitral awards therein, the Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia has
notably failed in both respects.
 
1
 
 This is attributable to a number of  factors, all of
which are unrelated to the contention that arbitration is not favoured in Islamic
jurisprudence. To the contrary, the Prophet Mohammed not only admonished
the use of  arbitration in the field of  family disputes,
 
2
 
 but also made it his practice
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1
 
See C.N. Brower and J.K. Sharpe, ‘International Arbitration and the Islamic World: the Third Phase’ in
(2003) 97 
 
AJIL
 
 643, who argue that we are currently experiencing a third phase of  business development, in
which a great number of  Muslim countries are actively participating in the global arbitration movement.
 
2
 
Quran
 
, verse 4:35; verse 49:9 is generally cited as exhortation to mediation.
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to resort to arbitration where disputes arose between Arab tribes,
 
3
 
 or between
Muslims and non-Muslims, the latter signified particularly with the signing of  the
622 AD Medinah Treaty. It is undeniable that the Islamic legal tradition, and
more particularly the teachings of  the Hanbali school, has played a significant
role in the shaping of  the Saudi attitude toward arbitration,
 
4
 
 but to argue that
Islam necessarily thwarts arbitration is unsustainable because neighbouring
Arab countries enjoying the same legal traditions have established themselves
as favourable arbitration fora and credible countries of  enforcement. Saudi
conservatism in the field of  arbitration, therefore, may currently be attributed to
a series of  arbitral awards rendered in the aftermath of  the early decolonisation
and nationalisation era, in which some arbitrators undermined Islamic law as
the applicable law of  the relevant contracts on the ground that it was either
insufficiently elaborate and therefore unsuitable for settling business disputes,
 
5
 
 or
that it simply could not secure the interests of  private parties.
 
6
 
 The rejection of
Islamic law (as a necessary extension of  local laws premised exclusively on the
 
Shari’a
 
) is even more remarkable if  one considers that the parties had agreed that
Islamic (or Saudi law, where relevant) was in part or in whole the applicable law
of  the contract.
 
7
 
 As a result of  the 
 
ARAMCO
 
 award, the Saudi government
adopted Resolution 58, which effectively closed the doors to all government
agencies to arbitrate with third entities.
 
8
 
The legal nature of  arbitration is itself  hotly contested in Islamic jurisprudence.
Some scholars are of  the view that arbitration is no more than a form of
conciliation whose purpose is to make peace between spouses, or, more broadly
for our purposes, the contracting parties.
 
9
 
 Others believe that arbitration is a
mechanism with binding character and in fact this is the prevailing view among
 
3
 
Reported in 
 
LIAMCO
 
 v. 
 
Libyan Arab Republic
 
 (1981) 62 ILR 140.
 
4
 
F.M. Kutty, ‘The Sharia Factor in International Commercial Arbitration’ in (2006) 28 
 
Loyola LA Int’l and
Comp. L Rev.
 
 565 at pp. 567–568.
 
5
 
Petroleum Development (Trucial Coasts) Ltd
 
 v. 
 
Sheikh of  Abu Dhabi
 
 (1951) 18 ILR 144, per Lord Asquith at 149;
 
Ruler of  Qatar
 
 v. 
 
Int’l Marine Oil Co. Ltd
 
 (1953) 20 ILR 534, per Bucknill J at 545.
 
6
 
Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia
 
 v. 
 
ARAMCO
 
 (1963) 27 ILR 117 at 169.
 
7
 
As a result, the arbitrators viewed the contracts as having been internationalised. 
 
See
 
 A. Anghie, 
 
Imperialism,
Sovereignty and the Making of  International Law
 
 (Cambridge UP, 2005), pp. 225–228.
 
8
 
Council of  Ministers Resolution No. 58 of  03/02/1383 H (25/06/1963). The 
 
ARAMCO
 
 arbitration award
was one of  the early cases concerning the international energy industry and one of  the very few cases
involving the Saudi government. The dispute occurred as a result of  the Onassis agreement between the
Government of  Saudi Arabia and the Greek-born shipping tycoon. The agreement granted Onassis the
right to establish a private company in Saudi Arabia under the commercial name of  Saudi Arabian
Maritime Tankers Company, which was granted the right of  priority for the transport of  oil for a period of
30 years. The dispute at issue arose when the government of  Saudi Arabia ordered ARAMCO to apply
Royal Decree No. 5737 of  9 April 1954 that ratified the Onassis agreement, itself  concluded 20 January
1954. The Royal Decree gave the Onassis agreement a legal status similar to that of  the ARAMCO
Concession Agreement of  1933 which was against the interest of  ARAMCO. The parties established an ad
hoc arbitration tribunal in 1954 but the final award was issued in 1958. One of  the most important
outcomes of  the final award was the dismissal of  the right of  the Saudi Arabian Maritime Tankers Company
to transport Saudi oil, which ended the short life of  that company.
 
9
 
See generally
 
, A.M. Al-Kenain, 
 
Altahkeem fee asshari’a Alislamiya; Altahkeem Al’am wa Altahkeem ind Asshiqaq Alzaouji
[Arbitration in Islamic Shari’a: General Arbitration and Arbitration in Matrimonial Disputes]
 
 (Dar Al Asima Lelnashr wa
Altaouze’ Publishers, 2000).
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the Hanbali school, which itself  is the dominant Islamic jurisprudence in Saudi
Arabia.
 
10
 
 In any event, mediation forms a very significant part of  popular and
legal culture in Saudi Arabia because the judge’s first duty is to mediate between
the parties before commencing trial proceedings. Equally, specialised commissions
under the Ministry of  Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of  Labour and
Social Affairs and the Saudi Monetary Agency, to which disputes are referred,
are not judicial bodies and mediation is an essential part of  their functions. For
instance, Article A of  the Royal Decree establishing the Committee for the
Settlement of  Banking Disputes provides for the formation of  a specialised
committee with the aim of  resolving conflicts with respect to banking disputes
in accordance with the contract signed by the parties.
 
11
 
 Moreover, there are a
number of  social factors that render mediation, in some cases, the most appropriate
means of  settling disputes.
The very limited number of  cases in which Saudi public entities are involved in
disputes with foreign investors do not usually reach the stage of  arbitration.
 
12
 
More recently, the Saudi practice, as reflected in a series of  2004 gas concession
agreements, provides for a negotiating period of  nine months before any of  the
parties can refer the dispute to arbitration. These considerations aside, reference
to arbitration in business contracts is very common and by no means a rare
phenomenon. This article does not examine arbitrations and contracts in which
the Saudi government is a party. Rather, it discusses the intricacies of  Saudi
legislation with respect to disputes referred to arbitration in which at least one of
the parties is either a Saudi national, an entity incorporated in Saudi Arabia, or
where a Saudi element is somehow involved over which Saudi courts would
normally entertain jurisdiction. The article traces all the stages, from the drafting
of  the arbitral clause to the enforcement of  the award, to demonstrate the
restrictions imposed therein by Saudi law and the binding supervisory authority
of  Saudi courts. The authors do not rely solely on the provisions of  Saudi arbitral
legislation, but instead strive to determine whether and to what degree the
relevant Saudi legislation is in conformity with Hanbali teachings pertaining to
arbitration, and if  the these two sources of  law are considered equally by the
judicial authorities.
 
II
II. THE SAUDI ARBITRATION ACT AND 
ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES
 
The Arbitration Act of  Saudi Arabia was adopted by Royal Decree No. M/46,
issued on 12/07/1403 H (1983), repealing in the process the relevant provisions
 
10
 
Quran
 
, verse 4:58. For a discussion of  the relevant positions, 
 
see
 
 Kutty, 
 
supra
 
 n. 4 at pp. 596–598; on 1/7/1347
H (1928), the Saudi Judicial Board addressed a resolution to Saudi courts that mandated them to rely on
Hanbali jurisprudence when adjudicating secular transactions. N.B. Turck, ‘Resolution of  Disputes in Saudi
Arabia’ in (1991) 6 
 
Arab LQ
 
 3.
 
11
 
Royal Decree No. 729/8 of  10/07/1407 H (1987).
 
12
 
Ed. Züblin AG
 
 v. 
 
Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia
 
, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/1.
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of  the Commercial Court Code of  1931.
 
13
 
 The Implementing Rules of  the
Act were subsequently adopted by Royal Decree in 1985.
 
14
 
 The purpose of  the
Implementing Rules was to supplement lacunae in the Act and provide guidance
on particular aspects of  Saudi arbitral proceedings. More specifically, the Act is
silent regarding numerous procedural issues, such as the rules pertaining to the
delivery of  arbitral awards, notifications as to the process and communication
between the parties and the arbitral tribunal and between the arbitral tribunal
and third parties, the seat of  the arbitral tribunal, and others. It will be
demonstrated that the Act constitutes a codification of  the Hanbali law of
arbitration
 
15
 
 as elaborated by Ibn Taymiyyah, (1263–1328), in his collection of
 
Fatwas
 
16
 
 and Ibn Qudamah (1146–1223), in his comprehensive work 
 
Almoghni
 
,
which is considered the most authoritative source of  Hanbali teachings until the
present day.
 
17
 
 The Act provides a framework for flexible commercial arbitration
with a view to establishing it as a real and effective alternative dispute resolution
mechanism. Prior to the adoption of  the 1983 Act, arbitration existed only as a
theoretical possibility on account of  several factors. First, the courts at the time
did not recognise arbitration agreements or clauses, even where the parties
claimed a contractual entitlement to arbitrate as a result. Even where the court
approved the arbitration agreement or clause, the subsequent enforcement of  the
arbitral award was wholly voluntary.
 
18
 
 Accordingly, reference to arbitration was
very limited. Secondly, the jurisdictional conflict between the Saudi Commercial
Court
 
19
 
 and 
 
Shari’a
 
 courts culminated in rendering arbitration ineffective and
time-consuming. Although, the Arbitration Act of  1983 superseded the
arbitration provisions of  the Commercial Court Code of  1931, ad hoc
 
13
 
Reprinted in 
 
Umm Alqura Gazette
 
, No. 2969 of  22/08/1403 H (1983).
 
14
 
Royal Decree No. M/7/2021, of  08/09/1405 H (1985), reprinted in 
 
Umm Alqura Gazette
 
, No. 3069 of  10/
10/1405 H (1985).
 
15
 
See generally
 
, S. Saleh, 
 
Commercial Arbitration in the Arab Middle East: a Study in Shari’a and Statute Law
 
 (Graham
and Trotman, 1984). 
 
See also
 
, I. Abdal-Haqq, ‘Islamic Law: an Overview of  Its Origin and Elements’ in
(2002) 7 
 
J Islamic Law and Culture
 
 28. The Hanbali school was founded by Ahmad bin Muhammad bin
Hanbal (780–855 AD), who was a narrator of  the 
 
Sunnah
 
 and a 
 
Shafi’e
 
 student. The teaching of  bin Hanbal
is relatively conservative because it is strongly based on the 
 
Qur’an
 
 and the 
 
Sunnah
 
, with a smaller room for
 
Qiyas
 
 and other methods of  reasoning. 
 
See infra
 
 n. 148. Although the Hanbalis are strict in religious ritual,
they are the most tolerant and flexible in commercial and financial transactions. Hanbalism is the official
religious school in Saudi Arabia; it is also widely spread in parts of  Syria and some of  the Gulf  States. In
1927, King Abdul-Aziz Al Saud declared his intention to draft a code embodying the teaching of  the
Hanbali scholar of  the late period, Ibn Taymiyyah. Although this plan was opposed by traditional religious
scholars and was eventually shelved, Ibn Taymiyyah’s teaching still remains one of  the main pillars of  the
Saudi legal system. Non-Saudis in general use the term 
 
Wahhabism
 
 when describing the Saudi legal system or
the official religious school in Saudi Arabia, which misrepresents the political history of  this country.
 
16
 
Ibn Taymiyyah, 
 
Majmou’ Alfatawa [Collection of  Fatwas]
 
 (Ministry of  Islamic Affairs of  Saudi Arabia, 1993),
vol. 29.
 
17
 
Ibn Qodamah Almaqdisi, 
 
Almoghni
 
 (Hajar Publications, 1992), vol. 10. The term 
 
Almoghni
 
 is an adjective that
has no equivalent in the English language, but an approximate translation could be ‘the comprehensive one’.
 
18
 
M.N. Albejad, 
 
Altahkeem fe Almamlakah Al arabiya Alsaudiya [Arbitration in Saudi Arabia]
 
 (Riyadh Institute of
Public Administration, 1999), p. 30.
 
19
 
Upon its establishment there was only one commercial court seated in Jeddah, which was later substituted
by the Commission for the Settlement of  Commercial Disputes under the supervision of  the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry.
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arbitrations lacking a commercial character are still governed by the provisions of
the Commercial Court Code.
 
20
 
 While one generally speaks of  either ad hoc or
institutional arbitration, in Saudi Arabia there is yet another classification on the
basis of  the nature of  the dispute as either compulsory or voluntary arbitration.
As a general rule, resort to arbitration is voluntary
 
21
 
 except where the regulator
recommends the compulsory route in a particular case. The rationale behind this
classification is to restrict the jurisdiction of  the 
 
Shari’a
 
 courts with respect to some
controversial matters under the 
 
Shari’a
 
, and also to avoid the conflict between
 
Shari’a
 
 and Saudi law, on the one hand, and Saudi law and some customs and
traditions, on the other hand.
 
22
 
The Arbitration Act of  1983 is relatively brief  and ambiguous in part and, as
already stated, lacks detail with respect to some key issues of  the arbitration
proceedings. Most ambiguous issues were ironed out in the Implementing Rules
of  1985. The Implementing Rules are elaborate and highly influential for both
arbitral tribunals and the judicial bodies overseeing the arbitral process in Saudi
Arabia. The following sections provide an analysis of  the Rules with reference to
Hanbali arbitration law and the relevant laws in Saudi Arabia, especially the Law
of  Procedure Before 
 
Shari’a
 
 Courts.
 
23
 
III
III. THE ‘COMPETENT AUTHORITIES’
 
In accordance with article 1 of  the Implementing Rules, arbitration is not
permitted with respect to disputes for which conciliation itself  is not permitted,
such as 
 
hodoud
 
,
 
24
 
 as well as in all matters relating to public order. As a result, the
1983 Arbitration Act followed the restriction imposed by some Hanbali scholars
and rejected arbitrability in criminal matters because they lack a commercial
character, and are moreover related to the power of  the state.
 
25
 
 Hanbali
jurisprudence confers upon an arbitrator the same jurisdiction as a court judge.
Ibn Taymiyyah did not restrict the scope of  arbitration, giving it instead the same
authority and function as litigation, save that an arbitral award is of  no value
without judicial investigation and confirmation.
 
26
 
20
 
Albejad, 
 
supra
 
 n. 18 at p. 30.
 
21
 
1983 Arbitration Act, art. 1.
 
22
 
Albejad, 
 
supra
 
 n. 18 at p. 51. Disputes related to tobacco products, insurance, musical instruments and
recordings are compulsorily referred to arbitration.
 
23
 
As we have already noted, under Hanbali teachings arbitration is equivalent to litigation and the arbitrator
is thus analogous to a private judge having specific jurisdiction over the issue at hand only. Article 36 of  the
Implementing Rules provides that the arbitral tribunal should comply with the litigation principles of  the
 
Shari’a
 
. The Implementing Rules were issued in 1985 prior to the enactment of  the 2000 Law of  Procedure
Before 
 
Shari’a
 
 Courts. Prior to the enactment of  the 2000 Law, arbitrators relied on 
 
Shari’a
 
 principles in order
to find governing rules for arbitral proceedings.
 
24
 
Hodoud
 
 are crimes for which the 
 
Quran
 
 provides corporal punishment, such as theft, adultery and accusation
of  adultery.
 
25
 
Ibn Qodamah, 
 
supra
 
 n. 17 at vol. 11, p. 484.
 
26
 
A.A.M. bin Mofleh, 
 
Al-Forou [The Branches]
 
 (A’alam Alkotoub Publishers, 1985), vol. 6, p. 440.
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The capacity of  parties to refer a matter to arbitration requires full legal
capacity with respect to age and state of  mind.
 
27
 
 The guardian of  a minor, an
appointed guardian or trustee of  a charitable trust, or what is so-called in Arabic
 
waqf
 
, cannot conclude arbitration agreements unless authorised by the court.
 
28
 
An arbitral award against the guardian of  an incapacitated person is invalid if  it
harms the interests of  that person, unless approved by a court.
 
29
 
 In accordance
with article 5 of  the Arbitration Act, the arbitration agreement must be submitted
for approval to the competent authority responsible for the subject matter of  the
dispute.
 
30
 
 Within its remit of  review of  arbitration agreements, the competent
authority definitively decides on the existence of  possible contradictions with
Saudi substantive and procedural law, as well as any violation of  public policy.
The only three competent authorities are the Diwan Alamzalim (Board of
Grievances), the Ministry of  Commerce and the Chambers of  Commerce and
Industry. A fourth authority exists, the Committee for the Settlement of  Banking
Disputes, whose jurisdiction and powers are exceptional, however, and only in
relation to banking disputes. The authority of  this entity will be analysed
separately in a following section. Upon approval of  the arbitration agreement, the
competent authority is under an obligation to inform the arbitral tribunal of  its
decision and subsequently advise it to proceed to the merits of  the dispute at
issue. If  any of  the parties refuses to arbitrate after concluding a binding, and
approved, arbitration clause, the other party may compose the 
 
compromis
 
unilaterally, but always under the supervision of  the competent authority.
 
31
 
Where the arbitration agreement (or clause) satisfies all the requirements for
approval but remains contested by one of  the parties, the competent authority
will inform the arbitral tribunal of  its approval and ask it to proceed as normal.
 
32
 
Let us now examine the legal nature and status of  the three afore-mentioned
competent authorities.
The Board of  Grievances, Diwan Almazalim, was created in 1955 as a
department of  the Council of  Ministers, Majlis Al Wuzara’.
 
33
 
 The Board was
later reconstituted as an independent entity.
 
34
 
 At first the Board served as a
general clearing-house for complaints of  a general nature, but it has since evolved
into the most important administrative and judicial entity outside the 
 
Shari’a
 
courts.
 
35
 
 Some authors have argued that the Diwan Almazalim is a sort of
Conseil d’Etat,36 and was itself  transplanted from the Egyptian legal system,
which in turn was premised on the Code of  Napoleon. However, the principle
27 1985 Implementing Rules, art. 2. See M. Zahraa, ‘The Legal Capacity of  Women in Islamic Law’ in (1996)
11 Arab LQ 245.
28 1985 Implementing Rules, art. 2.
29 Al-Kenain, supra n. 9 at p. 37.
30 Arbitration Act, art. 5, and Diwan Almazalim, Decision No. 59/T/4 of  1412 H (1992).
31 Diwan Almazalim, Decision No. 184/T/4 of  1412 H (1992).
32 See Diwan Alamzalim, Decision No. 150/T/4 of  1413 H (1993).
33 Royal Decree No. 02/13/8759 of  1374 H (1955).
34 Royal Decree No. (M/51) of  1402 H (1982).
35 G. Sfeir, ‘The Saudi Approach to Law Reform’ in (1988) 36 Am. J Comp. L 729.
36 Ibid.
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of  Qadi Almazalim is well known in Shari’a treatises many centuries prior to
the promulgation of  Napoleonic laws.37 Upon its establishment, the Diwan
Almazalim’s competence was limited to receiving and investigating complaints in
cases where the government or a governmental entity was a party to a dispute.38
Due to the rapid economic growth following the oil boom in the 1970s and the
trend to reduce the load of  Shari’a courts (as well as a desire to found a specialised
legal body for settling commercial matters where the application of  strict Shari’a
rules was viewed as an impediment to the flow of  foreign investment), the
settlement of  commercial and investment disputes was conveniently added to the
competence of  the Diwan.39 The Resolution granting the Diwan its additional
competence of  settling commercial disputes expressly provided, however, that this
was a temporary measure until such time as independent commercial courts
came into existence or were reconstituted.40 Prior to Resolution 261, the Diwan
was given the power to consider applications for the execution of  foreign
judgments and foreign arbitral awards where questions of  public policy were at
issue.41 The effect of  a new Resolution that was adopted in September 2007 was
to remove some of  the Diwan’s usual competencies as a commercial court and
transfer them to the Ministry of  Justice. However, for the purposes of  our
discussion, the supervision of  arbitral proceedings is still under its jurisdiction and
according to the new Resolution, the process will take at least two years before
the new commercial courts are able to start functioning. The new Resolution also
provides for moving the Review Committee for Commercial Matters to the
proposed Court of  Appeal.42 In the meantime, the Diwan’s competence remains
unchanged.
The Committee for the Settlement of  Commercial Disputes was established
in 1967 and superseded the Commercial Court established by the Commercial
Court Code of  1931. The Committee functioned under the supervision of  the
Ministry of  Commerce and Industry and assumeed jurisdiction over all disputes
involving the Kingdom’s commercial codes and regulations. The Committee had
the authority to settle all disputes arising under the Company Code, Services
Agency Code, Commercial Agency Code, as well as all disputes concerning
commercial land and maritime issues. Moreover, the Committee was empowered
to liquidate companies and impose penalties. Prior to the enactment of  the
37 See generally, M. Hanson, ‘The Influence of  French Law on the Legal Development of  Saudi Arabia’ in (1987)
2 Arab LQ 272.
38 Ibid.
39 The Diwan comprises five distinct divisions, which may be classified in accordance with their respective
jurisdiction into administrative and commercial divisions. The decision of  any of  these bodies or branches is
final and enforceable, unless an appeal is lodged. In the case of  appeal (which may concern both questions
of  fact and law), this may be brought before the Review Committee of  the Diwan, or what is known as Hay’at
Altadqeeq. The decisions of  the Review Committee are final and not subject to any further appeal.
40 Council of  Ministers Resolution No. 261 of  17/11/1423 H (2004).
41 See K.T. Roy, ‘The New York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Country Use the Public Policy Defence
to Refuse Enforcement of  Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards?’ in (1995) 18 Fordham Int’l LJ 920 at p. 922.
42 Regulation on Amendment to the Diwan Almazalim, reprinted in Umm Alqura Gazette, No. 4170 of  30/09/
1428 H (21/09/2007).
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Arbitration Act of  1983, the Committee was the principal supervisory body for
supervising arbitral proceedings.43 The Committee was composed of  three
branches that sat in Jeddah, Riyadh and Dammam. Each branch was composed
of  three full-time members, of  whom two were trained in Shari’a law and
nominated by the Ministry of  Justice, while the third was a legal consultant
trained in Saudi law and nominated by the Ministry of  Justice. The Committee
applied the Shari’a law of  procedure and evidence and the commercial codes and
royal decrees as substantive law. However, it may validly be claimed that the
Regulations applied by the Committee were out of  date in many respects, given
that most of  them were adopted prior to the 1980s and have not since been
subject to modifying improvements and modernisation.44
After the enactment of  the new regulations, this Committee no longer exists
and reference to it is made here to give the reader an understanding of  the way
in which the newly formed commercial courts were established as a successor to
the Committee for the Settlement of  Commercial Disputes and the commercial
department of  the Diwan Almazalim.
The role of  the Chamber of  Commerce and Industry as a competent authority
is regulated by article 5 of  the Chamber of  Commerce and Industry Regulation.
According to this, the Chambers are competent to resolve business disputes by
arbitration if  the parties so agree.45 There is little other in Saudi legislation on the
nature and functions of  the Chambers. It has been noted that the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry is not a popular supervisory body of  arbitration in Saudi
Arabia. Moreover, the Chamber is not the ideal supervisor of  arbitral proceedings
for the reason that the Chamber itself  is not a judicial or a semi-judicial body.
The Chamber mainly focuses on ad hoc arbitrations under the UNCITRAL
Rules and enjoys no popularity in Saudi Arabia because its function depends
heavily on the good faith of  the parties to the dispute.
a
(a) Supervisory Role of  the Arbitration Clause and Compromis by the Competent Authorities
Article 7 of  the Implementing Rules deals with the role of  the supervisory
authority vis-à-vis the arbitral proceedings. The supervisory authority is the
authority initially endowed with jurisdiction over the dispute as a whole,
including the question as to whether the dispute is subject to arbitration through
an arbitration agreement or clause, in the first place. This entity is obligated to
issue a decision approving the arbitration agreement within 15 days of  submission
43 Commercial Court Code, arts. 493–497; Royal Decree No. 23 of  15/01/1350 H (1931), reprinted in Umm
Alqura Gazette, No. 347 of  22/03/1350 H (1931).
44 To file a claim before the Committee, the claim must be directed either to the regional governor or
the Minister of  Commerce and Industry, who will then refer it to the Committee. The decisions of  the
Committee are final and enforceable; however, when the prevailing party seeks to enforce the decision, the
Committee will notify the regional governor that the decision is final and the governor will supervise its
execution. Appeals may be lodged within 15 days of  the date of  the issuance of  the final decision.
Commercial Court Code, arts. 459, 531 and 543.
45 Royal Decree No. (M/6) of  60/04/1400 H (1980).
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of  the agreement and must thereafter notify the arbitral tribunal of  its decision.46
Article 7, thus, codifies the teaching of  Ibn Taymiyyah who considered the
arbitral award to be of  no value without prior judicial confirmation.47 The
existence of  multiple competent authorities for the settlement of  commercial
disputes might seem problematic; however, it should be stated that the Diwan
Almazalim has supremacy over the Committee for the Settlement of  Commercial
Disputes of  the Ministry of  Commerce and Industry. Regardless of  the very recent
change in the Charter of  the Diwan Almazalim, which had the effect of  ceding
the competence of  settling commercial disputes to the Ministry of  Justice, the
supervision of  arbitral proceedings continues to remain within the Diwan’s
competences.48 As a general rule, the parties are bound by the Arbitration Act
and Implementing Rules at all stages of  the process and as a result if  any
agreement or action concluded therein is in conflict with this legislation it will be
deemed null and void. The Diwan in its decision 53/T/4 of  1414 H (1994)
nullified an arbitral award made without the supervision and approval of  the
competent authority. In that case, the parties agreed to arbitrate under the
supervision of  an entity other than the competent authority originally having
jurisdiction over the dispute. The Review Committee of  the Diwan set aside the
award on the afore-mentioned grounds. As a result, the appointment of  legal or
natural persons as supervisors of  arbitral proceedings in the Kingdom, other than
the competent authority, constitutes a ground for nullity.49 In another case, the Diwan
nullified an arbitral award rendered without an approved arbitration agreement.
There, the Diwan directed the arbitral tribunal to proceed in deciding the case
even though the arbitration agreement had not been approved by the Diwan. The
arbitral tribunal proceeded with the process by relying on its communication with
the Diwan, which included all the mandatory information; nonetheless, although
it was acknowledged that the Diwan was at fault for having failed to inform the
arbitral tribunal as to the requirement of  confirmation of  the compromis, the award
was considered null and void because it breached the relevant legislation.50
There is a dispute whether the competent authority exercises supremacy over
arbitral proceedings even in those cases where the tribunal is seated abroad. A
literal interpretation of  article 18 of  the Arbitration Act51 may be understood as
providing the supervisory authority with the power to act as an appellate body.
However, case law clearly regards the supervisory authority as a lower court and
the arbitral tribunal as supreme under such circumstances. Consequently, the
Diwan will not have the power to supervise arbitral proceedings taking place
46 Implementing Rules, art. 7.
47 Al Kenain, supra n. 9 at p. 49.
48 Reprinted in Umm Alqura Gazette, No. 4170 of  30/09/1428 H (12/10/2007).
49 Diwan Almazalim, Decision No. 61/T/4 of  1415 H (1995).
50 Diwan Almazalim, Decision No. 99/T/4 of  1414 H (1994).
51 Arbitration Act, art. 18 reads as follows: ‘All awards passed by the arbitrators, even though issued under an
investigation procedure, shall be filed within five days with the authority originally competent to hear the
dispute and the parties notified with copies thereof. Parties may submit their objections against what is issued
by arbitrators to the authority with which the award is filed, within fifteen days from the date they are
notified of  the arbitrators’ awards; otherwise such awards shall be final’.
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abroad and the appropriate lex arbitri under such circumstances will remain the
law of  the seat state. It is thus evident that Saudi legislators did not wish to
frustrate arbitral proceedings held abroad, even when there was a Saudi element
in the case, and have refused to impose Saudi lex arbitri to such cases. In case 53/
T/4 of  1415 H (1995), the Committee stated that: 
because the term ‘competent authority’ in the Arbitration Act and Implementing Rules does
not specify the degree of the court, the supervisory authority should apply its own rules of
procedure. With regard to the Diwan, we consider it a second degree court after the arbitration
tribunal; therefore, the Diwan should apply its own rules of procedure and the Diwan’s duty is
to uphold or reject the decision of the arbitration tribunal only.52
Therefore, the weight of  evidence suggests that where the seat of  the arbitral
tribunal is outside Saudi Arabia, the competent authority’s usual power of  confirming
the compatibility of  the compromis with Saudi law is inapplicable.
Finally, although state-investor arbitration is not within the purview of  this
article, some mention is warranted in terms of  explaining whether a degree of
confirmation is required thereto. The long-lasting negative impact on the Saudi
psyche from the ARAMCO arbitration is reflected in article 8 of  the Implementing
Rules and article 3 of  the Arbitration Act, following from the dramatic Council of
Ministers Resolution No. 58 of  196353 (adopted in the immediate aftermath of
the award), and the Deputy Minister of  Commerce’s Circular No. 3/9/sh/331/
9/2903 of  13/03/1399 H (1979).54 These legal instruments make it clear that
with respect to arbitral disputes to which a government entity is a party, the latter
shall prepare a memorandum about the arbitral process and include therein the
subject of  the dispute, the justification for arbitration and the names of  the
parties. This memorandum is to be submitted to the President of  the Council of
Ministers in order for it to consider approval of  the arbitration agreement. Some
governmental entities are allowed to insert arbitration clauses in their contracts
with private parties, but in all cases the Council of  Ministers should be notified of
the award rendered in relation to such disputes.55 In practice, if  a governmental
entity wishes to resort to arbitration for the settlement of  a dispute with a third
party, it is obliged to first obtain approval from the President of  the Council of
52 Diwan Almazalim, Decision No. 53/T/4 of  1415 H (1995).
53 See supra n. 8.
54 The Ministry of  Commerce Companies Circular No. 31/1/331/91 of  1979 confirmed the Council of
Ministers’ Resolution No. 58 of  1963 in prohibiting or restricting international arbitration. The Circular
stated that contractual clauses providing for arbitration (outside the Kingdom) and included in the articles of
association of  Saudi companies will be considered void. Moreover, articles of  association containing such
clauses will not be approved or registered. As a result, reference can only be made to domestic arbitration in
the articles of  association of  a joint company that is formed by foreign and local businessmen for the purpose
of  carrying out investment operations in Saudi Arabia. This restriction includes all types of  joint companies,
whether formed by foreign investors and a private Saudi party, or by foreign investors and the government
of  Saudi Arabia. See Y. Al-Samaan, ‘The Settlement of  Foreign Investment Disputes by Means of  Domestic
Arbitration in Saudi Arabia’ in (1994) 9 Arab LQ 217 at pp. 217–220, and Y. Al-Samaan, The Legal Protection
of  Foreign Investment in the Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia (Dar Al Andalus Publications, 2000), pp. 243–244.
55 Implementing Rules, art. 8.
Saudi Law as Lex Arbitri 249
Ministers; however, a governmental entity may incorporate an arbitration clause
in its contracts without approval from the President.56
b
(b) Committee for the Settlement of  Banking Disputes
The Committee for the Settlement of  Banking Disputes was established under the
aegis of  the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) with the aim of  settling
disputes between banks and their clients, where these arise from contracts and
transactions that are unrelated to commercial guarantees, such as bills of
exchange and letters of  credit, jurisdiction over which is vested in the other three
competent authorities.57 According to the Royal Decree establishing the
Committee, banking disputes may no longer be referred to Shari’a courts or the
Commission for the Settlement of  Commercial Disputes, unless otherwise
expressly authorised, but instead should be referred to the Committee. The new
Committee has been granted a wide field of  discretion by its founding decree.58
In order to enhance the authority and functions of  the Committee, the Minister
of  Justice officially informed all Shari’a courts about the Committee’s exclusive
rights and instructed them under strict terms to cease entertaining banking
disputes.59 The Committee’s competence in hearing banking disputes is exclusive.
Disputes of  this nature exist where at least one of  the parties is a bank and the
subject matter of  the dispute relates to a banking operation.60 As provided in
article 10 of  the Regulation of  Internal Procedures and Rules for the Function of
the Committee, the parties may agree to refer their dispute to arbitration, either
as an arbitration clause in their main contract after a dispute has arisen, or even
during the procedure before the Committee. Thus, the option of  arbitration is
not precluded on the grounds of  the Committee’s exclusive competence. As
arbitration clauses are considered to be valid, the question arises whether the
Committee can act as a supervisory authority over arbitral proceedings under the
Arbitration Act of  1983, in the same manner as the Diwan and the other two
afore-mentioned entities. The Arbitration Act provides that the competent
authority possesses a supervisory role over all stages of  the arbitral proceedings.
On the one hand, the Committee is the competent body for settling banking
disputes, but on the other hand, the Committee’s Regulation of  Internal
Procedures and Rules points out that the Committee is not in actual fact a court
56 For further details, see Appendix Z of  the 2004 Gas Concession Agreement between the Kingdom of  Saudi
Arabia and Lukoil Overseas Corp. and the 2004 Gas Concession Agreement with Sinopec Int’l Petroleum
& Production Corp, reprinted in Umm Alqura Gazette, No. 3990 of  15/03/1425 H (4/05/2004).
57 Royal Decree No. 729/8 of  10/07/1407 H (1987).
58 See R. Meyer-Reumann, ‘The Banking System in Saudi Arabia’ in (1995) 10 Arab LQ 207.
59 Circular of  the Minister of  Justice No. 732/8 of  10/07/1407 H (1987), which informed all Shari’a court
judges of  the exclusive jurisdiction of  the Committee for the Settlement of  Banking Disputes over disputes
arising out of  banking activities.
60 Banking business (or activities) has been defined in Banking Control Law of  1966, art 1.b, as the business of
receiving money on current or fixed deposit accounts, opening of  current accounts, opening of  letters of
credit, issuance of  letters of  guarantee, payment and collection of  cheques, payment orders, promissory notes
and equivalent exchanges of  value, discounting of  bills of  exchange and other commercial papers, foreign
exchange transactions and other banking business.
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in the sense of  Shari’a courts, nor a judicial body like the Diwan Almazalim.61 The
Regulation enables the Committee to refer disputes which it cannot itself
determine to the competent court that would normally exercise jurisdiction had
the dispute in question not been a banking one. This necessarily means that the
Committee cannot be classified as a ‘competent authority’ for the purposes of  the
Arbitration Act and is, therefore, not endowed with the authority to supervise
arbitration proceedings. In reality, the Committee is not a fully competent
authority to settle banking disputes and most disputes of  this nature are referred
to a very large degree to the Diwan Almazalim in its capacity as a competent
authority that supervises arbitration proceedings and reviews and enforces
arbitral awards.62
The enforcement of  the Committee’s decisions is severely obstructed since the
Regulation does not explicitly provide which entity is responsible for enforcing its
decisions and how this is to take place. The remedies available before the
Committee include the freezing of  the debtor’s assets, entitlements or funds held
by Saudi governmental agencies, or preventing the debtor from travelling outside
the Kingdom.63 Moreover, the Committee possesses the authority to prevent a
debtor from conducting any further business with the government, governmental
entities or even banks if  said person did not participate in the settlement
procedure and blocked any positive solutions. The Committee’s jurisdiction
encompasses also those cases involving claims of  a debtor of  a bank against the
government or a governmental agency.
IV
IV. LEGAL NATURE OF  THE COMPROMIS UNDER SAUDI LAW 
AND HANBALI TEACHINGS
It is within the purview of  the competent authority to recognise the legal validity
of  the arbitration agreement or clause. Article 6 of  the Implementing Rules
overcomes one of  the main impediments to arbitration in Saudi Arabia which is
the recognition of  the arbitration clause. Prior to the Arbitration Act, the Shari’a
courts did not recognise arbitration clauses as valid contracts under Islamic
law, deeming them to constitute speculative contracts or conditions. They did,
however, recognise compromis as valid contracts on the basis that they were not
speculative as a dispute was actually present, in contrast to arbitration clauses.
Article 6 specifies the minimum amount of  information that must be inserted in
the agreement. This includes a contractual undertaking by which the parties
agree to the appointment of  arbitrators, further adequately defining the subject
matter and scope of  the dispute and the names of  the arbitrators. This obviously
relates to a compromis. An agreement to arbitrate may also be made through an
arbitration clause relating to disputes arising out of  the main contract.64
61 See generally, Albejad, supra n. 18.
62 Meyer-Reumann, supra n. 58.
63 Ibid.
64 Implementing Rules, art. 6.
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The failure of  courts to recognise arbitration clauses was a striking feature
of  judicial practice under the Commercial Court Code of  1931, rendering
arbitration an impractical and time-consuming dispute settlement mechanism.65
The norm was for courts to reject the validity of  arbitration clauses because
judges doubted their compatibility with Shari’a, deeming them to encompass a
degree of  uncertainty as to the parties’ dispute. The rationale is astonishing to a
non-Muslim lawyer, but it is perfectly logical under the prescriptions of  Shari’a.
Whereas a condition for the validity of  an arbitration agreement is the existence
of  a dispute, where a dispute is stipulated in terms of  a future event, strictly
speaking the arbitration clause may be said to exist in a factual vacuum. Although
this has never been an issue under Western contract law (and, in fact, insurance
law, among others, is premised on future events), under Shari’a, a contract whose
object does not exist at the time of  its conclusion is invalid and is similar to a class
of  prohibited contracts, such as the selling of  fish in the sea or birds in the sky.66
On the contrary, Hanbali teaching, being the most flexible Islamic school in the
field of  commercial transactions, has always considered arbitration clauses as
possessing a valid contractual nature, insofar as they are not in conflict with the
purpose of  the contract and not prohibited under the Shari’a.67 The rejection of
arbitration clauses in Islamic jurisprudence, therefore, has arisen as a result of  the
judges’ misunderstanding of  the contractual nature of  such clauses.
Traditionally, a compromis under Islamic law requires the names of  the
arbitrators, the subject matter of  the dispute, applicable law, the dates of  the
proceedings, as well as the seat of  the arbitration.68 These requirements have
been historically associated with the famous incident of  Tahkeem, between Ali, the
fourth Caliph and Mu’awiyah, the governor of  Syria, in the year 659 AD. A civil
war had erupted as a result of  the assassination of  the third Islamic Caliph,
Othman, which lasted for more than two years. With a view to ending the civil
conflict, the dispute was submitted to arbitration by means of  a written
agreement, whereby the two parties agreed to appoint two named arbitrators,
a provision on the time limit for rendering the award, the applicable law and
the place where the award was to be made.69 The same legal tradition was
subsequently followed in the arbitration agreements between Saudi Arabia and
ARAMCO, as well as that between Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Oman in the
1950s.70 Under Saudi arbitration law, there is no need to determine the
applicable law in the compromis or the arbitration clause because this will always
65 See Albejad, supra n. 18 at p. 30.
66 See generally, N. Saleh, ‘The Law Governing Contracts in Arabia’ in (1989) 38 ICLQ 761; S.E. Rayner, The
Theory of  Contracts in Islamic Law (Kluwer, 1991).
67 See generally, Ibn Qudamah, supra n. 17 at vol. 14.
68 G. Sayen, ‘Arbitration, Conciliation and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi Arabia’ in (1987) 9 U Penn J
Int’l Business L 211.
69 Z. Alqurashi, ‘Arbitration under the Islamic Shari’a’ in (2003) 1 OGEL (March).
70 ARAMCO Award, supra n. 6 at p. 128. See also, Arbitration Agreement between the Government of  the
United Kingdom acting on behalf  of  the ruler of  Abu Dhabi and His Highness the Sultan Said bin Taimur,
the Sultan of  Oman, and the Government of  Saudi Arabia, signed in Jeddah on 30 July 1954 (Cmd. 9272,
1954), cited in J.B. Kelly, ‘The Buraimi Oasis Dispute’ in (1956) 32 International Affairs 318.
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be by default the Shari’a or Saudi law. This was, indeed, taken for granted in
the Tahkeem arbitration and has not subsequently been disputed in Islamic legal
scholarship. Moreover, Hanbali teachings grant the parties unrestricted freedom
to incorporate any other condition in their arbitration agreement, even if
irrelevant to their dispute, provided that it is not contrary to Shari’a principles.71
Under Saudi law, the existence of  the arbitration clause does not affect the
right of  the parties to resort to litigation. Case law demonstrates that referral of  a
dispute to litigation in the presence of  an arbitration clause constitutes an implied
waiver of  the parties’ right to arbitrate. In decision 29/T/4 of  1413 H (1993), the
Diwan emphasised the parties’ right to insist on the recognition of  arbitration as
a valid contractual undertaking for settling their disputes.72 For a while it was
thought that referring a dispute to litigation entails a waiver of  the parties’ right
to arbitrate, whereupon the arbitration clause ceases to have any legal effects.73
Although this view was initially supported by decision 72/T/4 of  1411 H (1991),
with which the Diwan rejected referral to arbitration where one of  the parties was
opposed to arbitration, the Review Committee of  the Diwan was of  an opposite
view. It held that referring a dispute to litigation while an arbitration agreement
is in existence, does not extinguish the parties’ right to refer their dispute to
arbitration. Subsequently, the Committee confirmed the nullification of  the
arbitration clause because the defendant raised his claim after referring the
dispute to litigation.74 The precise time when the right to arbitrate is waived by
referring the dispute to litigation is yet to be clearly determined, although it is
reasonable to suggest that it corresponds with the moment in time at which the
dispute is submitted to the Shari’a courts or the Diwan.
It is not of  concern to Saudi public policy that the arbitration clause has the
effect of  waiving the parties’ right to refer their dispute to litigation. If  one of  the
parties insists on his right to arbitrate, his claim should be submitted before
referring the dispute to litigation, as is clear from Diwan decisions 95/T/4 of
1413 H (1993) and 142/T/4 of  1409 H (1989).75 In the latter decision, the
Review Committee of  the Diwan emphasised that the parties have the right to
refer their dispute to litigation even if  they have a valid arbitration clause, since
litigation is the primary method for settling disputes and arbitration is an
exception, which itself  has no bearing on public policy.76 On the other hand,
referral to litigation does not affect the parties’ entitlement to arbitration. In case
27/T/4 of  1411 H (1991), the defendant argued that the plaintiff  sued him
before a court in the United States and that, therefore, that party had lost its right
to resort to arbitration. The Committee determined that the initial referral to
litigation did not affect the parties’ right to arbitrate.77 It is evident that the case
71 Sayen, supra n. 68 at p. 220.
72 Diwan Almazalim, Decisions Nos. 113/T/4 of  1416 H (1996) and 38/T/4 of  1409 H (1989).
73 Diwan Almazalim, Decision No. 29/T/4 of  1413 H (1993).
74 Diwan Almazalim, Decision No. 72/T/4 of  1411 H (1991).
75 Diwan Almazalim, Decision No. 95/T/4 of  1413 H (1993) and 142/T/4 of  1409 H (1989).
76 Ibid. Decision 142/T/4.
77 Diwan Almazalim, Decision No. 27/T/4 of  1411 H (1991).
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law is somewhat contradictory and it remains unclear whether referral of  the
dispute to litigation has the potential of  annulling the arbitration clause, or whether
said clause remains valid. It should be noted that, unlike common law and civil
law practice where judicial precedent plays a significant role in subsequent
judgments, Islamic courts are not generally bound by principles of  stare decisis.
Instead, Islamic courts rely principally on each individual judge or arbitrator’s
reasoning and understanding.78 Thus, judicial determination is, to a large degree,
personal and as a result produces significant legal uncertainty.
V
V. LEX ARBITRI AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF  THE STATUS 
OF  THE ARBITRATOR
Unlike arbitration statutes in non-Muslim countries, Muslim nations have
historically required that arbitrators determining cases wherein at least one party
is Muslim be themselves Muslim. Islamic law is clear on the prohibition of  non-
Muslims acting as arbitrators and there is general consensus among scholars that
non-Muslims are not allowed to adjudicate any dispute involving a Muslim
element within Muslim territory. This position is premised on the assumption that
arbitration is simply another form of  litigation.79 The rationale was that since the
substantive law of  the agreement would by necessity be Islamic law, only a
Muslim versed in it would be competent to interpret and apply it.80 The Saudi
Implementing Rules have not departed from this tradition.81 The arbitrator must
be a Muslim male of  Saudi nationality or a Muslim male of  any other nationality
practising a liberal profession, or otherwise be a public official endowed with
government approval to undertake the role of  arbitrator. If  there is more than one
arbitrator, the chairman should be knowledgeable in Shari’a rules, commercial
regulations, as well as the customs and traditions in effect in the Kingdom.82 The
appointment of  sole arbitrators, as well as the validity of  arbitral awards rendered
by sole arbitrators, has been confirmed through continuous practice as well as by
the decisions of  the Diwan.83
If  the arbitration agreement provides for the settlement of  the dispute by
conciliation, then the arbitrators/conciliators do not have to be Muslims because
this type of  agreement is considered an agency contract under Hanbali
jurisprudence, which non-Muslims are permitted to execute.84 Residing in Saudi
Arabia is not a condition for the validity of  the appointment of  the arbitrators.
The Arbitration Act is silent on the issue of  the place of  residence of  the
78 N.J. Coulson, A History of  Islamic Law (Edinburgh University Press, 1964), pp. 29–35.
79 M.H. Al-Fagy (ed.), Al-Ahkam Al-Sultaniyah [Royal Decisions], (Dar Alkotoub Alilmiyah Publishers, 1983),
p. 61.
80 Nonetheless, UAE Civil Procedure Code, art. 206(1) does not require that the arbitrator be Muslim and/or
male.
81 Implementing Rules, art. 3.
82 Ibid.
83 Diwan Almazalim, Decision No. 7/T/4 of  1419 H (1999).
84 Ibn Qodamah, supra n. 17 at vol. 14, p. 170.
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arbitrator and requires them simply to be Muslim males. In case 22/T/4 of  1413
H (1993), the Diwan Almazalim quashed the decision of  the Committee for
the Settlement of  Commercial Dispute which annulled the appointment of  an
arbitrator on the ground that although a Muslim, he was not a resident of  Saudi
Arabia. The Review Committee of  the Diwan added that such an additional
requirement imposed an unnecessary restriction.85
Further restrictions are imposed on the appointment of  the arbitrators in
respect of  impartiality, independence and credibility. According to article 4 of  the
Implementing Rules, the following persons are excluded: those with an interest in
the dispute; those convicted of  a hadd (single of  hodoud ), or penalty relating to a
crime of  dishonour; and those dismissed form public office by punitive decision
or court-based bankruptcy, unless relieved therefrom. The same restrictions may
be employed to challenge witnesses and evidence adduced as a result. The
appointment of  an arbitrator possessing any of  these traits violates the principle
that the arbitrator must be an adl.86 The appointment of  a fasiq (i.e. someone
guilty of  openly and flagrantly violating Islamic law and/or someone whose
moral character is corrupt) is void because arbitration under Hanbali teachings
is tantamount to litigation and therefore the arbitrator should possess all the
characteristics of  a court judge.87
Article 5 of  the Implementing Rules obliges the competent authorities to issue
an official updated list of  all licensed arbitrators; the list should be prepared by
agreement between the Minister of  Justice, the Minister of  Commerce and
Industry and the Chairman of  the Board of  Grievances. The courts, judicial
commissions and Chambers of  Commerce and Industry are notified of  the list
and disputants are at liberty to choose arbitrators from this list. The Ministry of
Justice requires simply that prospective arbitrators pass an exam before qualifying.
The exam is generally composed of  a range of  topics, such as the mandatory
rules of  Shari’a and the arbitration procedure under the Arbitration Act and
its Implementing Rules, in addition to the laws and customs concerning the
particular field in which the arbitrator intends to practice.88 The test itself  consists
of  a mere multiple-choice questionnaire that numbers 20 questions. The candidate
may download it from the website of  the Ministry and submit his responses by fax
or post. Given that the questionnaire does not cover a series of  important issues,
such as public policy, rendering of  awards, and rules of  procedure, inter alia, it is
obvious that the entire process not only lacks transparency, but moreover tolerates
and sustains incompetence.89 Not surprisingly, the credibility of  such a procedure
85 Diwan Almazalim, Decision No. 22/T/4 of  1412 H (1992).
86 Saleh, supra n. 15 at p. 36. Generally, the term adl refers to a person who does not violate Shari’a law and
possesses decent mental abilities.
87 Al-Kenain, supra n. 9 at pp. 77–79.
88 See Implementing Rules, art. 5. The list of  arbitrators is available on the website of  the Ministry of  Justice.
Available at www.moj.gov.sa/mojcontents.aspx?cms_id=84.
89 In recent years, some exam questions have asked candidates to identify article numbers within the
Arbitration Act and the Implementing Rules, the date of  ratification of  the 1958 New York Convention, as
well as explain what the initials of  UNCITRAL stand for!
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is disputed even in Saudi Arabia, because anyone can answer the questionnaire
for the candidate. Astonishingly, according to the website of  the Ministry of
Justice, if  a candidate fails in answering a question, he can attend an interview,
which may consist of  a mere repetition of  the initial questionnaire.90
VI
VI. ROLE OF  THE GOVERNING LAW OF  
THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE FOR THE DETERMINATION OF  
THE TRIBUNAL’S SEAT
If  the arbitration agreement provides for the settlement of  the dispute by means
of  arbitration outside Saudi Arabia, the agreement is valid only where the conflict
of  laws rules so permit and one of  the parties to the arbitration is not a Saudi
national. In decision 155/T/4 of  1415 H (1995), in which the defendant, a
foreign company, requested that arbitration should be held outside Saudi Arabia,
the Committee decided that the defendant was bound by the Saudi law of
arbitration, ordering therefore that the arbitral tribunal be seated in Saudi
Arabia, apply Saudi substantive law on the merits of  the dispute, and be
supervised by the Diwan Almazalim.91 It is crucial to emphasise, however, that
were a different law to apply with regard to the merits of  the dispute, the Diwan
would not oppose arbitral proceedings conducted outside the territory of  Saudi
Arabia, as was the case in decision 43/T/4 of  1416 H (1996). There, the parties
to the dispute, a Saudi and a US corporation, entered into a distribution
agreement that contained an arbitration clause stipulating that future disputes
were to be referred to the US State of  Iowa. The Diwan rejected the claim that
the dispute should have been settled in Saudi Arabia, holding that in the case at
hand, other foreign laws were also applicable, besides Saudi law. Moreover, when
the US party insisted on enforcement of  its entitlements under the arbitration
clause, the Diwan asked the parties to refer the dispute to their chosen contractual
forum.92
Where all the parties to the arbitration are Saudis and the dispute is subject to
Saudi law, there exists no right to arbitrate outside Saudi Arabia, or on the basis
of  foreign laws, as this would violate Saudi public policy. In case 143/T/4 of  1412
H (1992), the Saudi disputants agreed to refer their dispute to arbitration in
Zurich under the ICC’s Rules of  Procedure. Given that all the parties and the
subject matter were only of  Saudi concern, the arbitration clause was by
implication void as being contrary to public policy. The Committee commented
in its decision as follows: 
90 Ministry of  Justice of  Saudi Arabia, available at www.moj.gov.sa/UploadedImages2/20.doc. Another
striking contradiction is that whereas the Implementing Rules do not pose an obstacle to non-Saudi
Muslims, the Ministry of  Justice requires instead, through its website Circular, that applicants possess Saudi
nationality.
91 Diwan Almazalim, Decision No. 155/T/4 of  1415 H (1995).
92 Diwan Almazalim, Decision No. 43/T/4 of  1416 H (1996).
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This dispute is subject to Saudi law and the arbitration clause providing for the settlement of the
dispute by means of arbitration in Zurich under the rules of the ICC is null and void. Regardless
of its contradiction with the Saudi law of arbitration and its Implementing Rules, this is an
attempt to eliminate the jurisdiction of the Saudi judiciary over the dispute, which is against the
public policy of Saudi Arabia.
The Committee decided that the arbitration clause was null and void and obliged
the parties to refer the dispute to the Diwan Almazalim.93 It is evident, therefore,
as regards the issue of  applicable law, that where a foreign element is present in a
dispute, the Saudi courts will give weight to the place of  actual performance.
Nonetheless, the courts will not feel inclined to apply foreign laws in every case in
which such laws would otherwise be applicable, but will instead grant the parties
the choice of  settling their dispute before a court or through arbitration in the
given jurisdiction. Where, however, both parties are Saudi nationals, Saudi law
will always be the applicable law as well as the lex arbitri.
VII
VII. ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS: NOTIFICATIONS, 
REPRESENTATION AND FAILURE TO APPEAR
In the previous sections we examined the determining role of  the competent
authority with regard to the compromis. The same authority enjoys, moreover,
responsibilities vis-à-vis the proceedings themselves. The arbitral proceedings will
be supervised by the relevant competent authority, which will appoint a clerk to
act as a secretary for the arbitral tribunal. The duties of  the secretary include
establishing the necessary records necessary for the registration of  the request
for arbitration and their submission to the competent authority for approval.
The clerk is also responsible for issuing the notifications94 and communications
provided in the Arbitration Act and for any other duties assigned to him by the
competent Minister.95 Such notifications include those pertaining to the time and
place of  the hearings and all communications between the tribunal and the
competent authority, witnesses, experts and all other concerned individuals and
entities. The arbitral tribunal is under an obligation to set hearing dates within a
period not exceeding five days from the date of  its notification of  the decision
approving the arbitration agreement and must notify the parties accordingly
through the clerk of  the competent authority.96 Irrespective of  whether these
93 Diwan Almazalim, Decision No. 143/T/4 of  1412 H (1992).
94 Whereas generally notifications are addressed to the physical persons named as the parties to the dispute,
notifications to states are to be delivered to competent Ministers, regional governors or relevant heads of
government authorities, in accordance with Implementing Rules, arts. 13–15. Where the dispute relates to
companies, associations and private establishments, the notifications and communications are to be delivered
to the main office as set forth in the commercial register to the chairman of  the board of  directors, or to the
general manager, or to an employee substituting for such person; and with respect to foreign companies
having a branch or agent in the Kingdom, to such branch or agent. See Implementing Rules, art. 15 and
Law of  Procedure Before Shari’a Courts, art. 18.
95 Implementing Rules, art. 9. In accordance with Arbitration Act, art. 8, the clerk of  the relevant competent
authority will be in charge of  all notifications and notices related to the arbitration proceedings.
96 Implementing Rules, art. 10.
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notifications are carried out at the request of  any of  the parties or by an order of
the arbitrators, the clerk should be assisted by the police and the local authority
within the scope of  their area of  competence.97 Notifications and communications
are to be made exclusively in Arabic, addressed to all parties and must contain all
the required information.98
As regards representation, the parties should appear on the day of  the
hearings, either in person or through a representative pursuant to a power of
attorney, or what is known in Arabic as Wakalah, issued either by a notary
public,99 a designated public authority, or as certified by the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry. The option of  appearance through a representative
does not prejudice the right of  the tribunal to require the personal appearance of
a party, if  circumstances so require.100 The term Wakalah can be translated as
proxy, but under the Shari’a the legal effects of  a Wakalah are broader than a mere
agreement between two persons wherein one simply acts on behalf  of  the other. It
encompasses, in cases of  unconditional Wakalah, the entitlement to assume fully
the rights of  the principal party. In Islamic law, the Wakalah is a flexible, sui generis,
contract because of  the freedom of  the parties to dissolve it. It is dissolved, inter
alia, by the death of  the agent or the principal, regardless of  each party’s
knowledge as to the death of  the other. It may also be dissolved by resignation,
recession, or any other ground relating to the dissolution of  contracts. In the case
of  a conditional Wakalah, the contract terminates at the time of  its execution.
Where doubt persists, the power of  attorney terminates on the day the final
award is rendered.101 It is required that the agent be qualified to accept a power
of  attorney, according to law of  Saudi Arabia.102
If  one of  the parties fails to appear before the arbitral tribunal and the tribunal
is satisfied that said party was notified personally, it may decide the dispute in that
party’s absence if  the parties have deposited in the arbitration file a memorial of
their claims, defences, answers and supporting documents.103 The award in such
cases shall be deemed as if  all parties were present. Where a party was not duly
summoned, the proceedings will be postponed. If  there is more than one
defendant party and one of  these was not duly summoned and all the defendants
fail to appear, or the party not duly summoned fails to appear, the tribunal will,
save under urgent circumstances, adjourn its hearings to a later date. In the
97 Implementing Rules, art. 11 and Law of  Procedure Before Shari’a Courts, art. 15 determine that only the
Umdah (otherwise known as the chief  of  the quarter), the police, head of  the ‘centre’, or the chief  of  the tribe
can deliver communications and notifications.
98 See Implementing Rules, art. 12.
99 The body responsible for issuing powers of  attorney in Saudi Arabia is known as ketabat alad’l and
corresponds with the office of  Notary Public.
100 Implementing Rules, art. 17.
101 M. Alatasi, Sharh Almjallah [Commentary of  the Commercial Code of  the Ottoman Empire] (Maktabah Haqqaniyah
Publishers, 1949), vol. 5, arts. 1521–1530.
102 Persons who are unable to act as agents or accept the power of  attorney before Saudi judicial bodies include
minors, women and non-Saudis. See Code of  Law Practice of  Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree No. M/38 of  28/
06/1422 H (2001), reprinted in Umm Alqura Gazette, No. 3867 of  17/08/1422 H (2001).
103 Implementing Rules, art. 18.
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absence of  any failure to notify, the award will be deemed made as if  all parties
were present. The same is true where a party or his representative makes an
appearance at any hearing or submits a defence memorial, or a related
document. If  a defaulting party makes an appearance before the end of  the
hearings, the tribunal is obliged to reschedule the hearings anew, because the
defaulting party can no longer be considered duly notified and absent. Therefore,
any award issued without rescheduling the hearings anew will be null and void.
There are strict conditions attached to the issuance of  a judgment in absentia
under Hanbali teachings. Article 18 of  the Implementing Rules succinctly codifies
the exceptional cases where the tribunal can render an award without the
physical presence of  the parties to the dispute. Under Hanbali teachings, an
award rendered in absentia requires a judicial confirmation before its execution
because the defendant may have a defence against the claim; nonetheless, as a
general rule, the tribunal is not allowed to issue a judgment in absentia except as
mentioned above.104 The same applies mutatis mutantis in cases of  renotification.105
a
(a) Conduct of  Proceedings
Under traditional Islamic practice, disputes were settled in public places. The
judge or governor of  a region sat in the mosque or his Diwan to hear and settle
disputes. This tradition is reflected in article 20 of  the Implementing Rules,
according to which all cases must be publicly heard before arbitral tribunals,
unless said tribunals decide otherwise, either at their own initiative or following a
request by one of  the parties. Accordingly, any member of  the public is allowed to
attend the hearings without restriction.106 Where the arbitral tribunal decides to
privatise the hearings, it cannot extend this option to the rendering of  the final
award, which must always be made in public.107 This provision is evidently in
conflict with one of  the fundamental tenets and purposes of  arbitration, which is
confidentiality, which itself  is considered one of  the principal advantages of
arbitration over litigation.108 We have already stated that Saudi law does not view
arbitral and regular court proceedings as being fundamentally different in legal
nature. Some commentators claim that the objective behind the public nature of
arbitral proceedings is to enhance transparency and impartiality. This position,
however, is in stark contrast to current Saudi on-the-ground practice. As a general
rule, Saudi court proceedings are held in public. In reality, however, persons not
involved in the dispute cannot even enter the courtroom. In addition to the
negative attitude of  some judges to the attendance of  members of  the public
having no direct interest in the dispute, the infrastructure of  most courtrooms in
104 Ibn Qodamah, supra n. 17 at vol. 14, p. 96.
105 Implementing Rules, art. 19.
106 A. Aldar’an, Alqawa’ed Al ijrae’iyah fe Al morafa’at Alshar’iyah [Procedural Rules in Judicial Proceedings] (Altawbah
Publications, 1993), p. 67.
107 Implementing Rules, art. 20.
108 See A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Law and Practice of  International Commercial Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004),
pp. 32–39, wherein the authors furnish examples, however, demonstrating that complete confidentiality is
not an absolute rule in international arbitral practice.
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Saudi Arabia does not physically enable members of  the public to attend court
proceedings and the law is clearly out of  touch with reality by imposing publicity
upon arbitral proceedings when the public courts themselves do not apply the
same principle to their own proceedings. Article 20 of  the Implementing Rules is
also supported by article 61 of  the Law of  Procedure Before Shari’a Courts, which
states that the judge on his own initiative, or at the request of  one of  the litigants,
can close hearings to the public in order to maintain order, observe public
morality, or protect family privacy.109 Although this provision does not contradict
the Hanbali law of  arbitration, its contemporary application is at odds with the
internationally accepted private nature of  arbitration.
As a general rule, the arbitral tribunal is not allowed to decide the dispute
without hearing all the parties and giving them an equal chance to present their
evidence.110 Moreover, reliance on the arbitrator’s personal knowledge, without
any further corroborating evidence, is inadmissible because the suspicion of  bias
may constitute a valid ground for challenging the award.111 The typical
procedure before a Saudi court or arbitral tribunal consists of  three stages. First,
the plaintiff  raises his claim, which must be precise and detailed. The claim itself
may be presented in writing or orally on the day of  the hearing. At the second
stage the arbitrator invites the defendant to answer the plaintiff ’s claim, whereby
the defendant may either admit the claim (iqrar) or deny it (nokoul). If  the
defendant denies the claim, the arbitrator will ask the plaintiff  to adduce evidence
(baiyenah), which will take the form of  oral testimony. At the final stage, where the
plaintiff  fails to provide the tribunal with testimonial evidence, the arbitrator will
administer oath (yameen or qasam). If  the defendant swears that the claim is
groundless, the claim will be dismissed if  there is no further proof  adduced by the
plaintiff; however, if  the defendant refuses to take the oath, the case will be
decided in favour of  the plaintiff.112
In general terms, the chairman of  an arbitral tribunal has the same duties and
powers as a regular court judge.113 The main difference between arbitration and
litigation is the arbitrators’ lack of  enforcement power. Therefore, where arbitral
tribunals are faced with issues that do not fall within their competence, such as
forgery or corruption, the matter must be referred to the competent judicial or
executive body. Under such circumstances, arbitral proceedings are suspended
until such time as the crucial matter is resolved and a final and irrevocable
resolution, whether through judgment or otherwise, has been rendered by the
competent authority.114 As a result, there is no right of  imprisonment for
109 Law of  Procedure Before Shari’a Courts, art. 61. Royal Decree No. M/21 of  20/05/1421 H (2000),
reprinted in Umm Alqura Gazette, No. 3811 of  17/06/1421 H (2000).
110 Implementing Rules, art. 22. See also, Ibn Qodamah, supra n. 17 at vol. 14, p. 96.
111 Ibid.
112 See in general, Ibn Farhoun, Tabsirat Alhokkam Fe Usul Alaqdiyah Wa Manahej Alahkam [Judges’ Guide] (revised and
reprinted by T.A. Sa’ad, Maktabat Alkolliyat Alazhariyah Publishers, 1986).
113 Under Implementing Rules, art. 39, arbitrators are not bound by regulatory procedures, other than relevant
Saudi legislation.
114 Implementing Rules, art. 37.
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misbehaviour before the tribunal. In case of  misbehaviour, the chairman can only
expel the person from the place of  the hearing and report him to the competent
authority. Shari’a judges, on the other hand, have the power to imprison.115 Each
arbitrator has the right to direct questions and interrogate parties or witnesses
through the chairman of  the tribunal.116 Arbitral judges possess discretionary
power to postpone a hearing where the parties so request in order to better
prepare their cases.117 Although not even Diwan decisions constitute legally
binding precedent, in accordance with article 28 of  the Implementing Rules, the
parties may be asked by the tribunal to present any material that has probative
value for the settlement of  the dispute.118 The Diwan has clarified that this
may include foreign arbitral awards as precedent, provided they do not violate
the Shari’a and Saudi public policy.119 The arbitrator may order an investigation
of  the facts if  these are relevant, admissible and material to the dispute, as well
as depart from normal evidentiary procedure if  he sees fit and provides
justification.120 Witness statements are admissible only if  they are in conformity
with the Shari’a, the witnesses themselves have reached the age of  puberty, are not
subject to any incapacity and are trustworthy. Non-Muslim witness testimony is
admissible in all fields, except in relation to hodoud. The Shari’a requires a through
investigation of  witness trustworthiness because if  there is any doubt, such
testimony is inadmissible. Oral testimony is provided on-the-spot before the
chairman at the request of  one of  the parties. Witnesses may be disqualified for
reasons other than untrustworthiness, on the same grounds that a person may not
be qualified to assume the role of  an arbitrator.121 Experts are treated and
considered as witnesses for all legal purposes and can be challenged on the same
grounds as witnesses and arbitrators.122
Arabic is the official and only language applicable to arbitration
proceedings.123 This is true irrespective of  whether the proceedings are at a
written or oral phase. This language restriction is imposed upon all persons
participating in the arbitral proceedings. Foreigners not versed in Arabic must be
accompanied by an accredited translator who co-signs that part of  the record of
the hearing which was translated. Equally, given that Arabic is the official
language in Saudi Arabia, all communications with and contracts entered into
with Saudi governmental entities must be in Arabic. Although foreign parties
may enter into contracts with the Saudi government in which an additional
language is employed, where a dispute relating to the execution of  the contract
115 Law of  Procedure Before Shari’a Courts, arts. 69 and 70.
116 Implementing Rules, art. 23.
117 Ibid. art. 26. See also, Law of  Procedure Before Shari’a Courts, art. 65.
118 Supplementary expert witness statements are not binding upon the tribunal under Implementing Rules,
art. 34, and cannot even be classified as evidence under Hanbali teachings. See Ibn Qodamah, supra n. 17 at
vol. 14, p. 262.
119 Diwan Almazalim, Decision No. 29/T/4 of  1413 H (1993).
120 See Implementing Rules, arts. 29 and 30.
121 Ibn Qodamah, supra n. 17 at vol. 14, p. 262.
122 Implementing Rules, art. 33.
123 Ibid. art. 25.
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arises, it is only the Arabic text that is considered authoritative.124 This principle
was established through article 1 of  the Basic Law125 and was also supported by
article 1 of  the Law of  Procedure Before Shari’a Courts, which states that Arabic
is the official language for all hearings and communications and if  a circumstance
requires the use of  another language, the relevant document or hearing should be
translated into Arabic.126 In Hanbali teachings, if  one of  the parties to the dispute
does not speak Arabic and the arbitrator is not familiar with that party’s language,
an accredited translator must attend the hearing to assist in the proceedings. The
translators should possess the characteristics of  an adalah, or full legal capacity.127
Where the parties reach an extra-judicial settlement to their dispute, they can
request the tribunal at any stage of  the proceedings to record their agreement,
whether this is an admission, settlement, or waiver, and the tribunal will make an
award based on the parties’ agreement.128
VIII
VIII. CHALLENGING AND ENFORCING ARBITRAL AWARDS
Although the arbitral tribunal may not, during the review of  the case and
deliberation, hear explanations of  one of  the parties without the presence of  the
other party, nor receive memorials or documents unless the other party examines
the same, it may exceptionally consider new documents if  it deems them material
and of  probative value. If  it does so, it may extend the date for pronouncing the
award and reopen the proceedings by an intermediate award or interlocutory
decision in which its reasons and justifications are duly recorded and the parties
notified of  the supplementary hearing dates.129
All arbitral awards should be adopted by majority (except in cases of  sole
arbitrators) and should contain all the information for which the dispute was
referred to arbitration.130 Where unanimity has proven impossible, four methods
are supported under Islamic law and practice in order to bring such a result
about. First, when forming the arbitration agreement, the parties should insert an
odd number of  arbitrators. Secondly, where the parties initially decided on an
even number of  arbitrators and no unanimity was reached, they should seek the
assistance of  an external arbitrator who will decide the case according to his
opinion. The external arbitrator is not allowed to come up with a new opinion;
his job is to choose one of  the available decisions only.131 Thirdly, if  the arbitrators
fail to issue the award, the dispute can be decided by another tribunal or by a sole
124 See e.g., Gas Concession Agreement between the Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia and Lukoil Overseas, arts. 9–31,
reprinted in Umm Alqura Gazette, No. 3990 of  15/03/1425 H (4/05/2004).
125 Basic Law of  Saudi Arabia, Alnezam Alasasi Lelhokm. Royal Decree No. (90/A) of  28/06/1412 H (1992).
126 See Law of  Procedure Before Shari’a Courts, art. 1.
127 Ibn Qodamah, supra n. 17 at vol. 14 p. 84.
128 Implementing Rules, art. 24. The same is true with regard to Shari’a courts, according to Law of  Procedure
Before Shari’a Courts, art. 76.
129 Implementing Rules, art. 40 and Law of  Procedure Before Shari’a Courts, arts. 66, 159–160.
130 Implementing Rules, art. 41.
131 Al-Kenain, supra n. 9 at p. 124.
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arbitrator.132 This option may inconveniently prolong the dispute, which is
contrary to the supposed speedy nature of  arbitration. Fourthly, where unanimity
was not reached even though the parties exhausted the above-mentioned
methods, they can refer their dispute to litigation as a last resort.133 In practice, if
the arbitral tribunal fails to issue its decision within 90 days from the date of
approval of  the arbitration agreement by the supervisory authority, the case will
be referred to the Diwan, which will either act as an external arbitrator and
choose one of  the available opinions, decide the case anew, or grant the arbitral
tribunal a time extension.134
When making the award, the arbitral tribunal should not act ultra vires by
exceeding its terms of  reference and examine issues not encompassed in the
arbitration agreement. In case 33/T/4 of  1414 H (1994), the arbitration
agreement required the tribunal to determine the amount of  damages for the late
performance of  a contract. The arbitral tribunal thought it prudent to
additionally determine in the same award the initial cost of  the contract. The
determination of  this additional matter was rejected by the Diwan on the ground
of  exceeding the terms of  the arbitration agreement.135
The arbitral tribunal is responsible for correcting technical, typographic and
mathematical errors.136 It is also obliged to issue a supplementary award to
explain possible ambiguities and uncertainties in the text of  the arbitral award,
which can only be issued following a request from the parties.137 Where the
parties fail to prevail over all of  their claims, an award may be made apportioning
the fees between them according to the determination of  the supervisory
authority or allocating the entirety of  the fees against only one of  the parties.138
Any party may object to an order assessing the arbitrators’ fees to the authority.
The judgment of  the competent authority is final.139
The arbitral award becomes an enforceable instrument upon the issuance of
the enforcement order, which is the responsibility of  the supervisory authority.140
The supervisory authority must dispatch to the winning party the enforcement
copy of  the arbitral award, which ends with the following statement: ‘All
government departments and agencies concerned are hereby requested to
execute this judgment by all available legal means even if  it may require the use
of  coercive force by the police’.141 The supervisory authority cannot issue the
enforcement order unless requested to do so by the winning party or third parties
having an interest in the enforcement of  the arbitral award. The enforcement
request from third parties should be submitted to and accepted by the Diwan,
132 Ibn Qodamah, supra n. 17 at vol. 10, p. 546.
133 Ibid.
134 Diwan Almazalim, Decision No. 35/T/4 of  1418 H (1998).
135 Diwan Almazalim, Decision No. 33/T/4 of  1414 H (1994).
136 Implementing Rules, art. 42.
137 Ibid. art. 43.
138 Ibid. art. 45.
139 Ibid. art. 46.
140 Ibid. art. 44.
141 Ibid. art. 44 and Law of  Procedure Before Shari’a Courts, art. 196.
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provided that said third parties have an interest in the enforcement of  the award,
such as guarantors and creditors. The argument that such third parties possess no
entitlement because they are not parties to the arbitration agreement has been
rejected by the Diwan.142 In addition, the competent authority should ensure that
the party requesting the enforcement has an interest in the enforcement of  the
award, subsequently review the award itself  and confirm that it does not violate
the public policies of  the Kingdom.143
a
(a) Public Policy in Saudi Arabia
Public policy is of  a great importance to arbitration, especially when it comes to
the enforcement of  an arbitral award, irrespective of  whether this is a domestic or
a foreign award. As a general rule, an arbitral award is unenforceable if  it violates
the public policy of  the country where enforcement is sought.144 This is also true
in Saudi Arabia and is applicable to both foreign and domestic arbitral awards,
despite the fact that the latter proceedings have by the time of  enforcement
already been very closely monitored by the supervisory authority. As a result,
refusals to enforce are more common when setting aside foreign arbitral awards,
because public policy in Saudi Arabia covers a vast area of  practice that might be
unknown to foreign arbitrators sitting abroad and applying non-Saudi lex arbitri.
The following section aims to provide an overview of  Saudi public policy, its
sources and how it is applied in practice.
Public policy in the Saudi Kingdom is derived from three principal sources:
(a) the Shari’a; (b) Royal power which itself  is drawn from the Shari’a with an
emphasis on public customs and public interest within the framework of  the
Shari’a’s prescriptions; and (c) public morals. At the outset it should be noted that,
historically, a distinction has been drawn by Muslim scholars between Shari’a and
Islamic jurisprudence, or what is known in Arabic as fiqh. The concept of  Islamic
law was not in use at the time of  the Muslim classical scholars and began to
develop as a reaction to Western influence. The concept of  Shari’a is broader than
jurisprudence and the jurisprudence itself  comes within (as do other concepts of
Islam, such as Islamic creed and Quranic sciences) the umbrella of  Shari’a.145
Shari’a or Ash-Shari’a literally means the pathway or a way to be followed and the
way that a Muslim has to walk in life. In its original usage, the term Shari’a meant
the road to the watering place or path leading to the water, i.e. the way to the
source of  life.146 From the latter point of  view, Arab lexicographers have treated
the term and developed it to mean ‘the law of  water’ and in time it was extended
to cover all aspects of  Muslim life, both spiritual and that pertaining to the
142 Diwan Almazalim, Decision No. 136/T/4 of  1409 H (1989).
143 Albejad, supra n. 18 at p. 240.
144 See 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of  Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. 5, 330
UNTS 538.
145 I. Abdal-Haqq, ‘Islamic Law: an Overview of  its Origin and Elements’ in (2002) 7 J Islamic Law and Culture
27 at pp. 26–31.
146 Ibid.
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exigencies of  everyday life.147 Shari’a is best translated as the ‘way of  life’ and
Ash-Shari’a as the ‘way of  the Muslim life’, which is wider than the mere formal
rites and legal provisions. Islamic law may be defined as the entire system of  law
and jurisprudence associated with the religion of  Islam.
The primary sources of  Shari’a are the Qur’an and the Sunnah and there exists a
closed number of  other secondary sources or methods for adducing appropriate
normative behaviour in response to new incidents and unregulated circumstances.
These secondary sources are Ijma’, Ijtihad, Qiyas, public interest, custom, or what is
known in Arabic as Urf. The methods of  Ijma’, Ijtihad and Qiyas are employed in
the light of  current circumstances in order to shed light onto and analyse the
Quran and the Sunnah. The sustained use of  these secondary sources led to the
creation of  a body of  law known as fiqh.148 Western scholars tend to use the terms
Shari’a, and Islamic jurisprudence as ‘fiqh’, interchangeably. The afore-mentioned
distinction between the two should become clear and receive scholarly attention,
given that Shari’a is the foundation of  all doctrines formulated and developed
under fiqh, whereas the fiqh represents a human understanding and analysis of
Shari’a sources.149 The term ‘Saudi law’ is more comprehensive than Shari’a and
encompasses Islamic law and the Codes and Regulations adapted from other laws
within the general framework of  Shari’a principles. There are a few exceptions to
this rule, particularly as regards Saudi legislation that is unrelated to Islamic
teachings and principles, such as the Banking Control Law, because it regulates
some activities that are clearly prohibited under Islamic law.
In Saudi Arabia, the Shari’a’s primary sources, the Qur’an and the Sunna, have
supremacy over all laws and man-made regulations or normative instruments. In
the 1920s, King Abdul-Aziz attempted to codify the teachings of  the four Islamic
schools in a manner similar to that by which the Majalla codified Hanafi fiqh.
Despite his best efforts, this project was vociferously opposed by certain radical
scholars and did not materialise. In combination with his codification project, the
King ordered Shari’a judges not to be bound by the rules of  one school of  fiqh,
with the aim that the prevalence of  one school should not have the result of
abrogating another.150 At the same time, however, some Ulamas had their own
agenda; they not only opposed the King’s reform plans, but, moreover, sought to
exert pressure on judges in all Saudi courts with a view to applying exclusively
Hanbali fiqh under the teachings of  the late Scholar Ibn Taymiyyah. The main
reason for their opposition rested in their fear that the expansion of  civil codes
147 C. Mallat, ‘From Islamic to Middle Eastern Law: a Restatement of  the Field (Part 1)’ in (2003) 51 Am. J
Comp. L 699. See Quran, verses 45:18 and 5:48.
148 The Quran is the sacred book of  Islam, believed by Muslims to be the infallible word of  God dictated to
Prophet Muhammad; the Sunnah is a collection of  the sayings of  Prophet Muhammad, examples of  his
behaviour, things he approved and things he condemned during his lifetime. Ijma’ is the consensus of
qualified Islamic scholars of  a given generation on particular points of  Islamic law. Ijtihad translates from
Arabic as ‘human activity’ and refers in legal parlance to the endeavour of  a scholar to derive law on the
basis of  evidence found in the Shari’a texts. Qiyas constitute a process of  analogical reasoning from a known
injunction to a new injunction.
149 Abdal-Haqq, supra n. 145 at pp. 26–31.
150 Sfeir, supra n. 35 at pp. 729–744.
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could eventually culminate at the expense of  the Shari’a and ultimately lead to
the promulgation of  secular laws that have little or no connection with Shari’a. In
practice, although the Saudi legal system is premised on Shari’a on the basis of
Hanbali teachings, judges have the freedom to apply any of  the four schools of
fiqh.151 This judicial latitude granted to Saudi judges is the direct result of  the
afore-mentioned order of  King Abdul-Aziz to Shari’a judges.152 Saudi judges
currently rely on a number of  legal commentaries (authored by recognised
Islamic legal scholars) in the delivery of  their judgments, but it should be noted
that a codification of  these dispersed commentaries is expected in the foreseeable
future. Apart from Ibn Qudamah, the majority of  scholars who authored these
commentaries follow the teachings of  the Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyyah.153
According to article 7 of  the Saudi Basic Law, the ruling regime derives its
power from the Holy Qur’an and the Prophet’s Sunnah, which have supremacy over
all state laws.154 Accordingly, the imposition of  public policy restrictions within
the Kingdom cannot be relied upon to violate Shari’a principles under any
circumstances. The Basic Law even emphasises that even a temporary state of
emergency during turmoil cannot violate article 7, which renders the Shari’a the
only source of  regulation in the Kingdom.155
Just like Saudi law, the Kingdom itself  as a political entity is inseparable from
religion.156 Regardless of  his considerable regulatory authority, the King lacks the
power to legislate in the very extensive field which has already been regulated by
the Shari’a, in respect of  which he is bound by the same duty of  obedience as are
all of  his subjects.157 Consequently, it can be said that the separation of  law from
religion is impossible in most aspects affecting public life in Saudi Arabia. Given
the Kingdom’s political structure as an absolute monarchy, the King is endowed
with authority to promulgate regulations by issuing such royal decrees that
supplement existing Shari’a rules with a view to adapting to new circumstances,
especially in relation to trade and commerce. ‘In doing so, the Government tries
to balance traditional prospects against modern needs.’158 Royal Decrees can also
be considered a codification of  some aspects of  Shari’a law. This codification is
achieved with the assistance of  foreign laws and common practices which do not
necessarily violate Shari’a principles. The decisions of  judicial bodies have little
impact on public policy, because in Islamic legal practice they merely offer an
151 These religious schools are called in Arabic Mathahib and consist of  the Hanbali, Hanafi, Maliki and the
Shafi’e.
152 Sfeir, supra n. 35 at p. 732.
153 These books are Almoghni by Ibn Qudamah; Asharh Alkabeer by Ibn Qodamah; Sharh Zad Almustaqna’ by
Albahouti and Alhajjawi; Sharh Montaha Al Eradat by Alfoutohi and Albahouti; and Manar Assabeel by Meri’e
Alhabnali and Ibn Douawan.
154 See Saudi Basic Law, art. 7. Royal Decree No. (90/A) of  28/06/1412 H (1992).
155 Ibid. arts. 1 and 7.
156 D.J. Karl, ‘Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia: What Foreign Attorneys Should Know’ in (1991) 25 Geo. Wash. J
Int’l L and Econ. 131.
157 J. Schacht, ‘Islamic Law in Contemporary States’ in (1959) 8 Am. J Comp. L 133 at pp. 133–136.
158 Karl, supra n. 156 at p. 142.
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interpretation of  the Shari’a and relevant Royal Decrees and are, moreover,
subordinate to these.
What exactly constitutes public morals, interests and customs is not clearly
delineated in Saudi law. What is abundantly precise, however, is that anything
that is deemed as violating the Shari’a would certainly fall outside acceptable
public policy constraints. When discussing about Saudi society in search of  public
morals and interests, it should be noted that the terms Deen, which means
religion, and Adat, meaning custom, have been used interchangeably. The reason
for this lies in the fact that most customs and traditions have either been derived
from religion or upheld by it. This observation, however, may produce the
result of  restricting the enforcement of  foreign arbitral awards in cases where
the outcome of  an arbitral award is contrary to Saudi public customs. The
determination of  the concept of  public interest under Shari’a is derived through
the use of  the method of  istihsan. The term istihsan may be translated as ‘juristic
preference’.159 Another scholar preferred to translate it as ‘public interest’.
Conceptually, istihsan may be defined as the process of  selecting one acceptable
alternative over another, on the ground that the first appears more suitable for
the situation at hand, even though the selected solution may be technically
weaker than the rejected one. Equally, istihsan has been viewed as a process for
selecting the best solution for the general public interest as a form of  ijtihad.160
Istihsan allows judges and scholars some flexibility when interpreting the law to
allow for the infusion of  elements deemed useful. In other words, istihsan
constitutes a permit for the spirit of  the law to prevail over its letter.161 Slight
divergences exist between the various schools. Hanbali scholars call it istislah,
which may be translated as equity or public interest, whereas Maliki scholars
refer to it as Almasaleh Almursalah, which denotes a departure from strict textual
adherence in favour of  public welfare.162 The principal precondition for the
validity of  istihsan is its compliance with the principles of  Shari’a. Nonetheless,
there are situations where the non-application of  a Shari’a rule is more beneficial
for public interest than strict textual application. For instance, in the field of
finance and commerce, the application of  Shari’a may obfuscate socio-economic
development, as is the case with so-called istisna’ contracts.163 As a general rule,
159 H.E. Fadel, ‘The Islamic Viewpoint on New Assisted Reproductive Technology’ in (2002) 30 Fordham Urban
LJ 147 at pp. 148–150.
160 J. Makdisi, ‘Legal Logic and Equity in Islamic Law’ in (1985) 33 Am. J Comp. L 63 at pp. 63–78. For a brief
description of  ijtihad, see supra n. 148.
161 Fadel, supra n. 159 at p. 150.
162 Makdisi, supra n. 160 at p. 73.
163 Istisna’ contracts are derived originally from slam contracts, wherein one party paid a year in advance for
crops of  a particular weight at the time of  harvest. Istisna’, or sale by manufacture, is a contract to
manufacture a particular good not yet in existence, for an agreed price. The buyer need not pay for the good
until its acceptance and both parties may revoke their agreement at any time before delivery. See F.E. Vogel
and S.L. Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk and Return (Kluwer, 1998). Some scholars distinguished
between the slam and istisna’ contracts, but both seem to be based on the same theory; however, the slam is
used mainly in respect of  crops and carries a greater risk of  a future discounted price. Istisna’ contracts, on
the other hand, are more common in construction and manufacturing and are more flexible in that they
serve as financing and hedging tools.
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the object of  the contract must exist at the time when the contract becomes
binding upon the parties. The requirement of  the existence of  the object at the
moment of  the conclusion of  the contract was made to protect the parties from
assuming any risk through hazard or uncertainty likely to harm party interests.164
Public interest, therefore, required a relaxation of  strict contract rules. This was
done by Prophet Muhammad himself  when he allowed Muslims to conclude
contracts with future objectives under certain circumstances, even though the
general rule requires otherwise. At present, public interest is determined by
reference to specific suitable options within the framework of  the main principles
of  Shari’a.
The Kingdom maintains a negative list of  activities excluded from foreign
investment. This is a fine example of  activities prohibited for the benefit of  public
interest.165 When it comes to the protection of  public interest, Saudi authorities
consider the Shari’a at first instance, as well as the will of  its population. King
Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz in one of  his speeches to the Shura Council underlined
the fundamental tenets of  Saudi policy, stating that ‘we will work in the interest of
the religion, homeland, our citizens and our traditions’.166
IX
IX. CONCLUSION
In assessing a legal system that is fundamentally different to the types of  legal
systems that Western lawyers are used to, one must necessarily examine the
underlying reasons for such diversity. In the case of  Saudi arbitration law, it is
evident that two reasons are particularly prevalent. The first concerns the
Kingdom’s troubled post-colonisation past, during which some of  the arbitral
tribunals determining cases to which it was a party rejected Islamic law as the law
governing its contractual relations with third parties, even though this law was
clearly stipulated in the relevant contracts. The frustration and embarrassment
caused as a result had an impact far greater than merely downgrading the law of
a particular country under the pretext that it was undeveloped and backward.
Given that Islamic law does not only pervade all aspects of  normative conduct,
but also all other social and public conduct within Muslim societies, those
arbitral awards were perceived as having broader implications about Islam and
Muslim states. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is a very conservative country in every
respect, whose official policy strives to strike a balance between tradition and
modernisation.167
164 N. Comair-Obeid, ‘Particularity of  the Contract’s Subject-Matter in the Laws of  the Arab Middle East’ in
(1996) 11 Arab LQ 331 at pp. 331–336.
165 Saudi Arabia General Investment Agency (SAGIA), Negative List: Activities Excluded from Foreign
Investment, available at www.sagia.gov.sa/en/business-environment/investment-laws/negative-list.html
166 King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz, speech to the Shura Council in Riyadh, 14 April 2007.
167 ‘Some countries have sacrificed the soul of  their culture in order to acquire the tools of  Western technology.
We want the tools but not at the price of  annihilating our religion and cultural values.’ Statement made by Bakr
Abdullah Bakr, the Head of  King Fahd University of  Petroleum and Minerals, cited by W. Ochsenwald,
‘Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Revival’ in (1981) 13 Int’l J Middle East Studies 271 at pp. 271–272.
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The result in the Kingdom’s contemporary arbitral law and judicial practice is
hardly surprising. Disputes conducted in Saudi Arabia, or containing Saudi
elements, are governed by the Kingdom’s lex arbitri, which requires that not only
the arbitration clause and compromis be submitted to a designated competent
authority for approval, but that the proceedings be supervised by said competent
authority throughout their duration, save where conflict of  laws rules permit the
parties to refer to a foreign jurisdiction. Western lawyers may at first glance find
these restrictions as unduly compromising the benefits of  arbitration, but closer
examination reveals that equivalent procedures exist in developed arbitral fora.
For one thing, both in Europe and North America the arbitration clause may
be subject to scrutiny, either by the tribunal itself, or by reference to the courts
of  the lex arbitri. Equally, the parties are not generally free to turn to the civil
courts during the course of  the arbitral proceedings; institutional arbitration is
to some degree monitored by the relevant institutions; and, where significant
improprieties occur, whether in terms of  corruption or other, the parties may
approach the courts of  the lex arbitri. Finally, some Western arbitral legislation
provides that the award requires ratification by the courts before enforcement
proceedings can be undertaken.168 Moreover, as with Western public policy that
is dictated by reference to local laws and perhaps social customs, so it is with
Saudi Arabia that the Shari’a is the benchmark in respect of  public policy. Under
this light, Saudi arbitration law does not seem to differ much from its Western
contemporaries. Why, then, is it deemed problematic? The primary reason is
obvious; where a Saudi element is involved, the parties cannot escape been
subjected to Saudi lex arbitri. They could, of  course, arbitrate outside the Kingdom
and avoid all the relevant problems, but their award would subsequently be
unenforceable in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, although in most countries there
exists a consistent judicial practice that embraces the supervisory authority of  civil
courts over arbitral proceedings, in Saudi Arabia the situation is problematic.
Despite the fact that the Saudi competent authorities (particularly the Diwan) do
offer some jurisprudence as to their reasoning for either accepting or rejecting
arbitration clauses (and the validity of  the proceedings and compliance with
public policy), there is no sense of  precedent.169 The judges decide on the basis of
their personal opinions and are not obliged to adhere to any precedent, even if  a
decision of  the Review Committee of  the Diwan exists on a particular matter.
Moreover, these cases are not generally accessible and it is telling that this is
the first instance in which a compilation has been made with a view to their
examination. As a result, arbitration remains a very speculative business, since the
parties and their lawyers navigate through legal uncertainty. From an international
law point of  view, it may be argued that the decisions of  all competent authorities
are an expression of  state practice on the basis that they are organs of  the state.
Thus, even if  their decisions carry no binding precedent within the Saudi legal
168 See Redfern and Hunter, supra n. 108 at chs 9 and 10.
169 Nonetheless, as we have demonstrated, the Diwan is not opposed to the parties themselves introducing
foreign judgments, or arbitral awards, as evidence backing up their particular claims.
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system, at least said decisions reflect the will of  the Kingdom and bind it in its
international relations. In any event, there is no doubt that a Hanbali arbitration
law does exist, which itself  informs Saudi arbitral law. Our analysis has
demonstrated that this Hanbali corpus of  law is in fact more flexible than Saudi
law, particularly on the ground of  interpretative techniques. This finding should
dismiss the notion that Hanbalism is an archaic and backward-looking institution.
Parties intending to draft arbitration clauses and undertake arbitral proceedings
in Saudi Arabia, or elsewhere in cases where a Saudi element is involved, should
ensure that they are fully compliant with Shari’a law and Saudi public policy.
Given the requirements regarding the status of  arbitrators, foreign lawyers
dealing with such disputes must constantly be alert as to reliable arbitrators that
fulfil these exact criteria.
